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0 Introduct Ion
Seveso, Amoco Cad i z, Sandoz, Corunna and the Braer are nameS that
conjure up memories of major environmental accidents within the
European Community. They aroused public outrage and dramatized the
need to clean up and restore damaged env I ronments. However , damage from
Industrial accidents forms only a small part of the environmental
damage occurring within the Community today. Emissions from industrial
facilities and motor vehicles pollute the air, causing forests to die.
Waste waters from cities and farms pol lute surface and ground waters.
Hazardous .substances deposited in the past contaminate soi Is. The
damage caused by these non-accidental activities may be less
spectacular than damage from headline-grabbing accidents, but it 
more extensive, and no less in need of remedial action.
The quest ions ra i sed by the content of th i s Green Paper are posed to
provoke the wide-ranging discussion which the Commission seeks on this
subject of remedying environmental damage in order better to inform
its future actions in this area. To facilitate this debate and
discussion, the Commission wi II convene formal consultations, including
hear ings, wi th experts from the Member States as we II as wi th other
intere.sted parties such as industry and agriculture. Any proposal for
possible action presented by the Commission should be In accord with
the principle of subsidiarity, should be the subject of a cost-benefit
analySis and should take account of its coherence with other
propositions (such as taxes etc.
This Green Paper considers  first the usefulness of civi1 I iabi I ity as a
means for allocating responsibi i ity for the costs of environmental
restoration. Civi I I iabi lity Is a legal and financial tool used to
make those responsible for causing damage pay compensat Ion for the
costs of remedying that damage. By requiring those responsible to pay
the costs of the damage they cause, civil liability also has the
important secondary funct ion of enforc ing standards of behav iour and
preventing people from causing damage in the future. The subject is on
the env i ronmenta I protect ion agenda of the European Commun I ty today for
severa I reasons:
(a) The public demand for systems of accountability and
compensation that becomes strongest whenever environmental
accidents occur, I Ike the industr ial accident at Seveso or the
poisoning of the Rhine during the Sandoz fire.
(b) The pledge of the Counci I of Ministers to take act ion in the
area of civi I I iabi I ity when it adopted the Fourth and Fifth
Environmental Action Programmes and other legislation. (1)
Furthermore, the request of the Joint Transport and Environment
Council of 25 January 1993 for an "examination of the feasibility
(1) OJ No C 328, 7. 12.87, p. 15, paragraph 2. 5; Council Directive
84/631/EEC on the supervision and control within the European
Community of the transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste, OJ No L
326, 13. 12.
, p.
31.- 5 -
of deve lop I ng  system of pena I ties and c i v i I I i ab I I i ty for
pollution of the environment" , The Commission has already responded
to part of this request of the Council by adopting, on 24 February
1993 a Communi cat ion on "A Common Pol icy on Safe Seas,,(2)
(c) The Council of Europe has drawn up a Convention concerning strict I iabi I ity for damage resulting from activitie.s dangerous to the environment; other international organizations are making
efforts to set international conventions in place establ ishing
I iabi I ity regimes for environmental damage.
(d) The use of different systems of civil I iabi I ity for remedying
env i ronmenta I damage among the Member States could lead to
distortions of competition and the single market.
A Community-wide system of civi  I iability for environmental damage
would draw on a basic and universal principle of civil law , the
concept that a person shou I d rect i fy damage that he causes. Th i s I ega I
principle is strongly related to two principles forming the basis of
Community environmental POliCY since the adoption of the Single Act
the principle of prevention and the "polluter pays" principle.
The "polluter pays" principle is evoked , because civi I I iabi lity 
a means for making parties causing pollution to pay for damage that
results. The prevention principle is involved in that potential
polluters who know they wi II be liable for the costs of remedying the
damage they cause have a strong i ncent i ve to avo id caus i ng such damage.
If civil liability for environmental damage operates differently 
Member States , industries in some Member States wi II be required to pay
the costs of the damage they cause, whi Ie industr ies in other Member
States wi II be able to avoid those costs, because restorat ion is not
required or the cost is passed on to taxpayers. Industries not
required to pay restoration costs receive, in effect , a competitive
advantage.
A genera I system for env i ronmenta I damage represents for sectors such
as transport a way of internal ising certain external costs.
The Green Paper seeks  secondly to investigate the possibility '
remedying environmental damage not met by the application of civi I
liability principles. Details of existing joint compensation schemes,
their problems and limitations are therefore canvassed.
It should be noted that despite the importance of the question of
penalties, these are not the sUbject of this Communication.
(2) com(93)66 f ina I- 6 -
Remedy I ng env I ronmental
II abl I Ity;
damage using Mchan I sms civil
The prob I ems
The legal doctrine of civil liability provides a way for the injured
party to obtain compensation for the damage he has suffered. . It was
deve loped to cover s i tua tl ons where it was more just to make the person
responsible for the act or incident causing the damage to bear the
consequent costs, either because that person Was at fault or should for
other reasons be held liable for losses resulting from the damage.
Civil liability arises under private law distinguishing it from
Obi Igatlons arising under pub I ic law, such as criminal Ilabi I ity and
administrative liability.
There are two poss i b I e approaches to c i v i I
strict I iabi lity.
I iabi I ity. with fault and
1.1 Fault-based liability
Liabi.1 ity because of fault requires proof that the I iable party
commi tied a neg I i gent or otherw i se wrongfu I act wh i ch caused damage. A
finding of fault depends on whether the party had a duty to behave
according to a certain standard of care or rule of law, and .breached
that duty.
In the field of environmental I iabll ity, there is a strong interplay
between fault-based I iabi I ity and environmental regulations. The
standards and the procedures set down In env i ronmenta I statutes can
provide guidance for determining whether a party actions were
reasonable or negl igent under the circumstances. Non-compl iance with
environmental laws can provide evidence of fault. On the other hand,
compl iance with regulations and permits can indicate the r.easonableness
of a party s behaviour. As environmental protection laws are enacted,
new obligations arise that could lead to potential liability.
Under fault-based I iabi I ity, the victim may have difficulty proving the
other party ' s act was wrongfu I .
The vigorous use of fault-based liability by government authorities can
thus play an important role in ensuring that environmental legislation
is respected, as well as providing a means of recovering the costs of
repair ing environmental damage caused by wrongful acts. Liabi I ity for
fault does not , however, provide a means to recover costs where fault
cannot be shown.
Strict liability
Strict liability, or liability without fault , eases the burden of
establishing liability because fault need not be established. However,- 7 -
the injured party must st I II prove that the damage was caused by
someone act. Strict liability provides an incentive for taking
measures to prevent damage from occurring in the first place.
Defining the scope of a strict liability regime for damage to the
environment is a difficult but esSential step. Potentially liable
part les need to know the scope of the costs they would be expected to
pay in case of damage. This need for legal certainty confl icts with
the need for flexible definitions that can take account of new
technologies or other unforeseeable developments.
Some major difficulties can arise in applying chi I I iabi Iity concepts
to obtain compensation for environmental damage. Conclusive scientific
evidence is often unavailable , for example, regarding the long-term
effects of a g i veh po II utant on the env ironment. concepts such as
" I i ab i I i ty , " "damage, " and espec ia II y "environment" are vague and
ambiguous , and interpretations vary from one legal system to the next.
A strict I iabi I Ity regime that is too broad in scope may come to be
regarded , in certain cases as too expensive for the sectors concerned.
Some argue, for example, that strict liability can stifle investment 
industry. On the other hand , a regime that is too narrow in scope runs the risk of not covering all the activities it should and thus
improper I y a Ilocat i ng costs of restor i ng damage.
The criti.cal step is to decide which activities and processes shoUld be
subject to such a regime. Some of the factors that could be considered
in determining the appropriateness of strict I iabi I ity for a particular
sector or type of activity Include:
the types of hazard posed by a particular activity;
the probabi I ity that damage might occur from the activity, and
the possible extent of that damage;
the incentive that strict liability would provide for better
risk management and prevent ion of damage;
the feasibi I ity and cost of restoring the damage that would be
I ikely to occur; and
the potential financial burden of strict
economi c sector i nvo I ved.
I jab i I i ty on the
the need for and avai labi I ity of insurance.
Channell Ing LIability
Determining who should bear the I iabi I ity can also be difficult.
Imposing liability on a specific party, known as "channeillng, " can be
an efficient and equitable way of cost internalization. It can also
promote the prevention aspect of strict tiabi I ity, if I iabi I ity 
channelled to the party having the expertise , resources, and
operational control to carry out the most effective risk management.- 8-
Multiplicity of liable parties
Where more than one party may have been responsible for the damage, or
for a share of the damage, problems In how to apportion liability for
the damage may arise. To ease the injured party s burden of bringing
suit against multiple parties, legal systems often permit the case to
bepresent$d against more than one potentially I iable party at the same
time. How the liability Is then apportioned among the liable parties
depends Oh whether liability is joint or joint-and-several. Under
joint liability, the liable party must pay compensation only for that
amount of damage which can be actually attributed to his particular
activity. In the case of aggregate pollution, precise determinations
may be i mposs i b Ie.
Under joint-and-several liability, each party is liable for the entire
amount , but may often proceed in turn to seek contr ibut ion from other
I iable parties. This can cause several problems, inCluding congestion
in the courts. Inequity results if the injured party sues the party
with the most financial assets first , instead of the party who caused
the most damage. This is known as the "deep pocket" effect. Joint-and~
several liability may also lead to "forum-shopping," if parties are
from different countries and one country s laws are more favourable to
the injured party.
As liable parties sort out among themselves how the costs of
compensation should be shared I itigation becomes complex. This can
make civil liabi I ity  compensation mechanism with extremely high
transaction costs. A way to alleviate such problems is to a.llocate
responslbJlity in advance by designating the order in whJch potentially
liable part les should be sued or by the channelling of liability.
Who and what Is damaging the environment
I f the act that causes damage can be character i zed as a fau I t or if.
there are other circumstances creating a responsibility, the person
caus i ng the damage becomes I i able for the consequences. Fau I t can
consist of an intention to cause damage, or carelessness which resu.lts
in a damage. The law of civi I I iabi I ity generally has few problems
dealing with damage caused by the wi Iful or negl igent act of a
particular party, if the I iable party is identifiable and the damage
can be causa II Y linked to the wrongfu I act.
However, prob I ems ar i se where these elements are not c I ear:
Chronic pollution
Env i ronmenta I damage may occur because of the aggregate effect of a
number of polluting acts spread out over time and place. Where the
damage has been caused by the cumulative impact of the activities of
many operators, it is not possible to determine which actor s actions
caused the particular damage. This is the case with discharges to the
a~mosphere which result in acid rain. Sometimes none of the acts are
such that they would incur damage resulting in I iabi I ity. For example,
a single authorized discharge of pollutants into a river may not cause
identifiable damage, but the combined impact of all the authorized
discharges is to damage the river.- 9 -
In the case of damage caused by cumulative pollution it is difficult to
attribute damage to the act or responsibi I ity of a particular party and
it becomes necessary to exp lore more co II ect i ve ways of shar I ng the
responsibility for the costs of restoration , such as joint mechanisms
of compensation. CSeesection 3. 0 below)
Ii) Emissions under government author izat Ion
The purpose of environmental permits is to enable government
author I ties to Ilmi t the total amount of pOllutants to a leve I that
will not cause unacceptab I  impact or damage. Th is requ i res 
determinat Ion of the leve I of pollution at wh ich damage occurs, then an
allocation of permits restricting total e~issions to below that level.
However, it is often difficult to foresee, let alone assess, all the
immediate or long-term effects of pollutants and the margin of safety
needed to prevent damage. Consequent I y the s i tuat ion can ar i se where
damages to the environment do occur, in spite of the fact that all
relevant emissions are authorized.
I f the operator exceeds the I imi t values set in the permi t or carr ies
out other activities not foreseen in the permit , the operator should be
held I iable for any resulting damage. On the other hand if the
operator has fully disclosed all relevant data for evaluation by the
permitting authority and complied with the standards set in the permit
there may be reasons for ho I ding the pub I i c author i ty -- and ultimate I y
the taxpayer -- responsible for ensuing damage. It would provide the
operator with an incentive for full disclosure and compliance with the
permit, .so as to avoid I iabi lity. It would provide the government
authority With an incentive to make responsible decisions, including
setting precise and clear restrictions in permits.
I I I) Damage from the past
Deposits of hazardous substances from long ago pose one of the most
significant types of environmental damage within the Community, Other
types of damage from the past , such as acid-rain devastated forests
are a I so in urgent need of cleanup or other remed ia I act ion.
Civil liability may not , however , provide a way to recover the costs of
restoring such damage. Sometimes the damage is from so far back 
time that no liable party is identifiable. Sometimes the party can be
Identified but is not I iable, because I iabl I ity was not establ ished
when the damage occurred. Or the party may be Identifiable, liable,
but insolvent.
Limitation of liability
There is debate on whether strict liability should be limited. Some
argue that If a liable party has taken all reasonable measures of
prevention and has insUred against the cost of foreseeable accidental
damage, it does not make sense to dr i ve him out of bus i ness 
unforeseeab I  and unpreventab I  damage occurs. The des ired resu It
after a II is to reCover restor at ion costs and to prevent future- 10 -
damage, not bankruptcy. On the other hand, limits on liability could
reduce incentive for prevent ion and transfer the burden of restor at ion
costs above those limits to the taxpayer, thus interfering with the
pol luter pays. principle.
Any limits on liability would have to be set at a high level so as not
to underm i ne the prevent ion funct ion of str i ct Ii abi I i ty. An OECD
draft recommendation on compensation for victims of accidental
pollutlon(3) suggests that, if limits are set , potential polluters
might also be requi red to contr ibute to a compensat ion fund to cover
the portion of costs over the limits paid by liable parties.
1. 7 Defining environmental damage
legal definition of damage to the environment is of fundamental
importance, since such a definition wi II drive the process of
determining the type and scope of the necessary remedial action -- and
thus the costs that are recoverable via civil liability. Legal
definitions often clash with popularly held concepts of damage to the
environment, yet are necessary for legal certainty. But the debate
over how to define the object of environmental damage, the degree of
impact cons i dered damage, and who has the right to dec i de these issues
has not yet been resolved.
Regarding the definition of "environment " some argue that only plant
and animal life and other naturally occurring objects, as well as their
interrelationships, should be included. Others would include objects
of human origin, if important to a people s cultural heritage. The
draft Council of Europe Convention, for example, puts forward the
fo Ilow i ng broad def in i t ion of the env ironment: " Env ironment i nc I udes
natural resources both abiotic and biotic, such as air , water , soil,
fauna and flora and the interaction between the same factors; property
which forms part of the cultural heritage; and the characteristic
aspects of the landscape.
Another debate centres on the degree of impact that should be
considered environmental damage. The amended Commission proposal for a
Counc i I Oi rect i ve on c i v i I I i ab i I i ty for damage caused by waste def i ned
impairment of the environment" as meaning "any significant physical,
chemical or biological deterioration of the environment"(4) . Actual
physical destruction or gross contamination is generally considered
damage, but what about lesser Impacts? All human activities result 
emissions, but the point at which these emissions are to be considered
pollution" is not clear. Nor is it clear at which point "pollution
causes actua I damage.
Problems In proving causation
To obtain compensation for damage , the injured party must prove that
the damage was caused by an act of the I iable party, or by an incident
for which the liable party was responsible. Special problems arise 
the case of environmental damage. As discussed in the sect ion on
(3) C(91) 53, August 1991 (OECD).
(4) Com(91)219 final OJ N' C 192. 23. 07. 91, p. 6- 11 -
chronic pollution, establ ishing a causal connection may not be possible
if the damage is the .result of activities of many different parties.
Difficulties also arise if the damage does not manifest unti I after a
lapse of time. Finally, the state of science regarding the causal I ink
between exposure to pollution and damage Is highly uncertain. The
liable party may try to refute the Injured party evidence of
causal1ty wIth alternate sc1entif1c explanations for the damage.
The right to br log a legal act ion
In a civi I I iabi I ity case, the right to sUe is normally given only to
the party with a legal interest in recovering compensation. Where
damage occurs to property that is not owned , no injured party with the
right to bring a legal action can be identified. With no legal or
natural person to sue on behalf of the environment , the costs of
restoring environmental damage cannot be recovered via civil liability.
There ex i st sever a I d i f ferent approaches to the Quest i on of access to
just I ce for env I ronmenta I mat ters among the Member States.
1. 10 The question of adequate remedy
The traditional aim of civil Ii.ability is to compensate the injUred
par ty by reQu i ring the par ty respons ib I e for the damage to pay the
costs of any resulting loss. The loss is generally computed in terms
of the depreciat ion In economic value of the damaged property or the
actual cost of repairing the damage. Damage to the environment wh.ich
does not in itself have an economic value but may have great value 
other terms -- such as the loss of a spec i es or of a pic tur esque
landscape -- cannot be compensated directly in terms of economic loss.
However , if there is an obligation to maintain those elements of the
environment in a healthy state, a concurrent obligation arises to
restore these elements to that state whenever they are damaged. This
obligation carries with it the right to claim the costs of restoration
from the party who caused the damage. The amount of compensat ion the
liable party is obliged to pay is computed in terms of the actual cost
of environmental restoration.
The objective of environmental protection efforts is to maintain the
environment at the level of quality that society determines. Where
environments are damaged below that standard , restoration is the only
environmentally sound remedy. In order for civi I I iabi I ity to function
effect i ve I y as a lega I remedy, a base of legal duty and econom i c
assessment must a I so be in p I ace.
1.11 The problem of Insurabi Iity
Discussions of civil liabi I ity inevitably raise Questions about
insurability, since insurance is a means of controlling the risk of
econom i c loss.
Insurance serves as an important compensat Ion mechanism where damage
occurs accidentally and restorat ion costs are covered by the insurance
pol icy. If an insurer I inks avai labil ity of insurance to the Qual ity- 12 -
of an enterpr ise' s ri sk management, it may have a deter.rent effect 
promoting better accident prevention and other environmental protection
controls over the economic activity.
The uncertainties which make civil liability a difficult fit for
environmental damage also create problems with regard to Insurance.
Insurers are hesitant to provide coverage if they are uncertain about
the types and probabilities of damage that may occur, or if unpredicted
losseS drain the pool of money. The civil I iabi I ity regime
established, the absence of limits on liability, and the coverage of
particular risks such as gradual pollution are some of the factors
which make It hard for Insurers to determine the insurabil ity of what
are already extremely complicated risks and, In some cases, to decide
how much cover they are able to provide. They react by raising the
prices of premiums or by withdrawing from the market of environmental
liability insurance altogether. (S)
Today, insurance coverage for pollution-related damage can be difficult
and even impossible to obtain in some cases. It is a relatively new
service and not all insurers have the technology or capacity yet for
providing it. At present there are many cases where studies on the
insurability of these risks are preceded by preliminary technical
studies. Insurers may I.imit their potential losses contractually by
excluding specific risks from coverage or by lowering the maximum
amount of coverage. They may invol ve the pol icyho I der f inanc i a 11 y 
the effort to avoid loss by applying sizable deductibles to each loss.
Insurers have also sought to I imit coverage of accidental losses to
damage occurring by a "sudden" event , a definition which excludes
damage caused gradually, such as a slow leak from an underground tank.
France, Italy, and the Netherlands have intervened to set up pools of
insur ance to cover gr adua I as we I I as sudden pol I uti on.
There is some movement today to require certain industries or
activities posing particular hazards to cover their potential liability
through some kind of financial security. For example. the recent
German Environmental Liability Act requires specific Installations to
ensure secur i ty to cover I lab i I i ty . The proposed 0 i rect i ve for c i v i I
liability for damage resulting from waste would require the liability
of the producer and the el iminator to be covered by insurance or any
other financial security.
A number of concerns ar i se when insurance is requ ired. If insurance 
compulsory, enterprises must be able to obtain coverage on the market
for the requ i red amount. Such coverage may not be ava i I ab Ie. I f it is
ava I I ab I e and t he cost of restor i ng the env ironment a I damage I s above
the policy amount , the liable party must still pay the additional
amount.
(5) A rise in tort liability claims for p01lutlon-related damage is one
reason cited for the I labl I ity insurance crisis in the United
States In the 1980s. Other explanations for the dislocations
within the U. S. insurance market at that time include recurrent
historical cycles of hard and soft insurance markets and changes in
the supply of capital avai lab.le to insurers.- 13 -
Under compulsory Insurance, Insurers might become " I icensors
Industry, by providing or withholding Insurance coverage according to
whether the I ndustry member seek i ng coverage was a "good" or a "bad"
risk. Some insurers already evaluate the quality of a firm risk
management and loss prevent ion measures, before prov I ding env i ronmenta I
liability coverage. From an environmental protection point of view
risk evaluation by the Insurance Industry is beneficial , since 
reduces the risk of env i ronmenta I damage at the same time that 
reduces the insurers ' risk of economic loss. However , the problem of
the "bad r isle" who cannot obta in insurance coverage rema ins.
Imposing I iabi lity insurance on firms and activities which represent a
danger to the environment presupposes that the insurabi I Ity of such
risks wil1 be determined and if~ w1th due regard to the nature of the
risk , insurance is made aya II ab Ie, the cond I t ions of coverage and the
system of civil liability envisaged will have to be establ ished. state
intervention may be necessary if private insurers do not provide
insurance coverage adequate to cover the risk of environmental damage,
or if premiums are too high for SMEs. One feature of such intervention
might be to avoid creating unjustified discrimination between firms or
imposing obi igations which vary according to company size.
Cons i der a t i on must be given to the exper i ences of count r i es such as
France. I ta I y and the Nether lands, wh i ch have a I ready set up insurance
pools for covering pollution damage, and the lessons to be learned from
the German law on environmental I iabl I Ity, which contains specific
provisions on insurance.
It s possible to require insurance cover to be taken out by operators
but many industry members oppose compulsory insurance because they fear it 1N0uid make them captive to high premium demands from insurers.
Larger companies are already leaving the insurance market because they
find it more economical to self- insure. This creates problems for
small and medium sized enterprises (SME) -- those most in need of
I Lab il i ty insurance for envi ronmenta I damage -- because it I eaves them
with less economic leverage to fight expensive premiums.
2 The General Trends In the law on environmental liability
It is important to evaluate the position regarding civi I I iabi I ity 
the Member States and in the framework provided by international
conventions to identify the trends which they reveal , taleing account 
the problems raised in relation to reparation of, damage to the
eny Ironment.- 14 -
1 General view of the trends at national level
Concepts of liability for damage to the environment are relatively
recent. The need to develop specific rules has not been felt by all
Member states since a number of cases where damage was caused to the
environment could fall under the more traditional types of liability.
Most leg i s I at Ion wh i ch has been deve loped has been based on these
concepts and has tried to adapt them In order to cover the specific
nature of damage to the env ironment.
In general civi  Ilabi I ity for environmental damage in the twelve
Member States rests upon fau I t on the part of the person who causes the
damage.
In the absence of specific legislation on Civil liability for
env i ronmenta I damage, the courts of I aw have tended , where damage has
occurred, not always to ask for full evidence of the fault of the
wrongdoer, or to find other ways of easing the victim s burden of
proving damage, or the link of causation between that damage, the
wrongful act and the fault. This haS been done within the I imits for
judicial interpretation existing in the Member states and with
considerable variations from one Member state to another.
This general approach (fault-based I iabi I ity) is associated with
another trend, the development of a strict liability regime. Several
laws have Introduced I iabi I Ity without fault for damage caused by
specific activities which were deemed to be dangerous. Thus, liability
for damage caused during air or rai Iway transport (most Member states),
for damage caused by pipe I i oes for hydrocarbons (Denmark), dangerous
activities in general (Italy, Portugal), the handling of dangerous
substances (Netherlands), nuclear energy (several Member States), or
biotechnology (Germany) has been introduced by legislation.
It appears that there is not Within the Member States any recent
legislation on environmental damage which does not provide for strict
I iabi I Ity. In the Annex is a I ist of certain of the Member State
legislation which has adopted this approach. Within this legislation
certain characteristics can be identified.
From these general trends in national legislation for the restoration
of damaged env i ronments it is poss i b I e to i dent i fy car ta in common
char acter i st i cs.
The Question of what constitutes  damaae to the environment is scarcely
addressed by the different pieces of national legislation. The
different pieces of national legislation refer, rather, to general
principles of law and provide for compensation for death, bodily injury
or for damage to an attr I buted item of property.
The legislat ion does not normally contain rules on the  burden of proof
or the  I ink of causation Here the general principles of law of each
Member State apply as they have evolved through legislat ion and court
juriSprudence. However, the solutions contained in the German-
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of 11 March 1941 formally recognizes the liability of the state on
whose territory the activities causing the transfrontier damage take
p I ace. (6)
Civi I I labi I ity for env ironmental harm is dealt with in a number of
international instruments. Table I in the Annex sets out international
conventions deal ing with I iabi I ity and compensation which are either
already existing or under negotiation. Table II I ists  number of
convention$, either already existing or under negotiation which contain
provisions relating to clvi  I iabi I ity.
It is possible to discern a number of common points between the
Convention on Third Party Llabl I Ity In the Field of Nuclear Energy
(Paris 1960), the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (Brussels 1969), and the Council of Europe Convention
on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to
the Env ironment.
All estab1ish a system of  strict I iabi I itv , with provision for certain
number of exempt ions or defences.
As regards the  channell i no of reSDons i b i I i tv I i abil i ty at taches to the
operator (Paris Convention Article 3, Brussels Convention Article 3.
Counci I of Europe Convention Articles 6 and 7). It should be noted
that the Brussels Convention channels liability to the owner of the
ship at the moment of the incident , and expressly excludes action
against any other person, such as agents of the owner , caption etc,
unless such a person has acted with t he i ntent i on to cause damage or
knowing th.at damage would result from their action (Article 3, amended
in 1984). Nevertheless the owner of the ship is not liable if they can
show that the pollut ion damage results frOm an act of war , from
hosti I ities, civi I war, or insurrection, .or from a natural phenomenon
which is exceptional , inevitable and unavoidable.
In the Brussels Convention damaIJe to the environment has the following
definition: "pollution damage" means " loss or damage caused outside
the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or
discharge of oj I from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may
occur, and includes the cost of preventative measures and further loss
or damage caused by preventat ive measures " (Art icle n. The Convent ion
provides that the liability of the owner may be limited, unless the
incident occurs as a result of the fault of the owner.
In the Counci I of Europe Convent ion the  Droblem of channeilina of
liabilitv is resolved as follows: The Convention channels liability w
the operator , defined as " the person who exercises the control of a
dangerous activity " (Article 2.5). Dangerous activities are defined as
act i v i ties per formed profess i ona II y and i nvo I v i ng dangerous substances,
genet i ca I I y mod i f i ed organ isms, or micro-organ isms.
The  definition of damaIJe in the Convention includes impairment of the
environment insofar as this is not covered by damage to persons or
property "provided that compensation for impairment of the environment,
(6) Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int' l Arb.
Awards 1905 (1941).
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other than for loss of profit from such impairment, shall be I imited to
the costs of measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be
undertaken
" .
Concerning the  scope of I iabi I ity , for the majority, these instruments
are I Imited to damage caused by specific economiC activities. (Nuclear
energy, carr i age of dangerous goods, hydrocarbons, operat ions i nvo I v i ng
dangerous substances etc.
Article VII(1) of the Brussels Convention provides, as regards
insurance that " the owner of a ship registered in a Contract ing State
and carrying more than 2000 tonnes of oil in bulk as cargo shall be
required to maintain insurance or other financial security, such as the
guarantee of a bank or certificate delivered by an international
compensation fund, in a sum fixed by applying the limits of liability
prescribed (in the Convention) to cover his liability for pollution
damage under this Convent ion
As regards  limitation of liability the Brussels Convention provides
that a shipowner can limit liabi I ity to an aggregate amount of 2000
francs per tonne not exceeding 210 mi II ion francs (franc is defined in
the Convent ion).
Concern i ng t he quest i on of  risk i nsur ance the Counc i I of Europe
Convention provides for a compulsory financial security scheme, taking
account of the particular risks posed by the activity, without a
speciflcal1y identified 1Jmit on liabi1lty.
3 The position taken at Community 19vel
Community-wide action involving the dt)ctrine of civil liability has
been taken primarily in the area of product safety and consumer
protection. In 1985, the Council adopted Directive 85/374/EEC
institutin strict liability for the producer of defective
products. The Directive is based on the concept of the
defective product," i. e. a product which does not provide the safety
which a person is entitled to expect. It provides that the
manu f acturer of t he defect i ve product is I i ab I e for t he damage, even
where not at fault , unless he can prove that the product's defect is
due to compl lance with mandatory regulat ions issued by publ ic
authorities. The Directive covers only losses suffered by a private
(7) Council Directive 85/374/EEC .of 25 July 1985 on the approximation
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the
Member States concerning I iabi I ity for defective products (OJ.No L
210 85, p. 29).- 18 ~
consumer. I t does not cover  damaae to the env Ironment I f that damage
is not damage to property owned by a pr I vate person. The Quest ion of
insurabi I ity is not addressed in the framework of this Direct ive.
Applications of civil liability for environmental protection purposes
have been discussed for some time. In 1984 , for Instance, the Counci 
adopted Directive 84/631/EEC on the supervision and control within the
European Commun i ty of the transfront fer shi pment of hazardOus
waste. (8) The 19th recital called for a defining of the liability of
the producer and any other person accountab I e for damage " in order to
guarantee effective and fair compensation for damage which may be
caused during the Shipment of dangerous waste, Article 11(3)
expressly provided for the Council to determine the conditions for
implementing civi I I iabi I ity for the producer.
In 1986, following the Sandoz fire which resulted In the poisoning of
the Rhine River , the Council declared that the key to more effective
protection of Community waterways lay in, inter al ia, prompt cleanup
and restoration , coupled with equitable arrangements for I labi I ity and
compensation by the polluters for any damage caused.(9) It called on
the Commission to review the Community existing measures for
preventing pollution and for remedying damage caused by pollution and
if necessary, to submit appropriate proposalS. Two weeks later the
European Parliament adopted a complementary resolution calling
expressly on the Commission to "put forward proposals for a Community
system governing fault (siC) I iabll ity for accidents connected with
all chemical and high risk activities. ,,(10)
The adoption of the Single Act in 1986 and the insertion of Art. 130r
into the EEC Treaty provided impetus for further discussion of civi I
I iabil ity for environmental damage. This article provides that action
by the Community relating to the environment shall be based inter
al ia, on the pr inciple that the polluter should pay. The  Dol luter
DayS DrinciDle seeks to properly attribute external costs of
pollution. Community appl ications to date have aimed at making
operators bear the costs of env i ronmenta I protect ion measures imposed
by the pub I Ic authorlties.(11) In addition, the Directives on waste,
waste 0 ii , and tox i c and dangerous waste( 12) make express reference
to the "polluter pays " principle as the basis for a system making the
holder and/or the producer of waste responsible for the costs of safe
disposal. Civi I I i.abi I ity for the cost of cleaning up environmental
contamination wou1d be a concrete application of this principle.
(8) OJ No L 326, 13, 12. 84, p. 31.
(9) Bull. EC 11-1986, point 2.146.  (10) Doc. B 2 - 1259/86, OJ No C 7 12.01. , p. 116. The French
text calls for " responsabi lite civi Ie sans faute.
An elaboration of the "polluter pays " principle can be found 
Council Recommendation 79/3/EEC, OJ No L 5 79, p. 29.
Counci I Directive 75/442/EEC, OJ No L 194 , 25. 75, p. 39;
Counc I I Direct i ve 75/ 439/EEC, OJ No L 194 , 25. 75, p. 23;
Council Directive 78/319/EEC, OJ No L 326, 13. 12.
, p.
31.
( 11)
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In response to these developments, the Fourth Environmental Action
Programme, (13) re I eased in 1987 , dec I ared that the Comm I ssion wou I d
consider the scope for arriving at  better definition of
responsibi I ity in the field of the environment , and envisaged the
possibility that the polluter should assume greater liability for
dam.age caused by prOducts or processes. In addition , after requests in
1989 and 1990 from the European Par I iament for an absolute I iabi I i ty
regime for damage resulting from the release Into the environment of
genetically mOdified organisms, the Commission pledged to consider the issue of civil liability for damage to the environment
horizontally. (14)
In October 1989 , the Commission presented a proposal for a Counci I
Directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste. (15) This
proposes a no-fault I iabi Iity regime. As regards the  channellina of
I i ab i I i tv the Direct i ve states that the producer of waste sha II be
st r i ct I y I I ab I e for damage and i mpa i rment of the env I ronment caused by
waste. The party bringing the action must demonstrate the causal I ink
between the waste and the damage. The draft Directive extends the
notion of  damage to " impairment of the environment" as set out 
section 2. above. This definition of impairment is capable of
including cases where the environment is affected In a continuing
manner. Regarding the question of  insurance the draft Directive
requires the producer and el imina tor of waste to be covered by
insurance or other financial security. Article 3(2) of the proposed
Directive states that the producer must include in his annual report
the name of his insurers for civi I I iabi I Ity purposes. The draft
Directive al$o authorizes the Commission to studY the feasibility of
sett i ng up a compensat ion fund for damage and impa i rment to the
env ironment caused by waste incases where the person I i ab I e cannot be
identified or is insolvent. The initial proposal for a Directive has
been amended to incorporate proposals made by the Parliament (16) and
is under cons i derat ion by the Counc i I .
In the Commission proposal for a Counci I Directive on the Landfi II of
Waste Article 14 provides that " the operator shall be l iable under
civl I law for the damage and impairment of the environment caused by
the landfi lied waste, irrespective of fault on his part. ,,(17)
( 13) Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the
Governments of the Member states, meeting within the Council of
19 October 1987 , on the continuation and implementation of a
European Community pol icy and action programme on the
environment (1987-1992), OJ No C 328, 12. , p. 15, paragraph 5. 
SEC (89) 2091 final - SYN 131 , 6. 12.89.
OJ No C 251 10. , p. 3.
OJ No C 192 23. 07. , p. 6.
OJ N' C 190 22. 07.91, p. 
( 14)
( 15)
(16)
( 17)- 20 -
0 Remedying envlronmenta1 damage through Joint compensation systems
Joint compensat ion systems are financial structures based on charges or
contributions. They are .Insurance-I Ike, in that the funds collected
are designated for a specific purpose, such as cleaning up or restoring
the environment. The principle of liability for particular acts 
expanded into a principle of shared responslbi I Ity for the impact of
multiple acts. Joint compensation systems sustained by contributionS
from the economic sectors most closely I inked to the type of damage
needing restor at ion would be concrete applicat ions of the "polluter
pays" principle. Inter alia these systems enable the problems outlined
in section 2. 1.5 above ( damage from chronic pollution, authorised
pollut Ion and past pollution) to be resolved.
The cost of damage I inked to the aggregate impact of a sector
activities becomes apportioned among the individual enterprises, and
thereby i nterna I i zed.
There are several other important advantages to the compensation system
approach in view of the specific features of environmental damage.
First, the ability to act quickly may be essential in some instances of
environmental damage. In contrast to civi I I iabi lity, whiCh requires a
lengthY legal process before obtaining compensation , joint compensation
systems can gather funds in advance. Financing could thus be readi Iy
available for emergency remedial action or to reimburse early
restor at ion work. Moreover, the burden of damage may be more eas 
il Y
shouldered by collective rather than individual action. Finally, if
the cost of cleaning UP a particular Incident is high, it may not be
possible to recover all the costs from a liable party with limited
financial resources. A joint compensation system would help provide
the additional resources needed for carrying out the restoration.
There are however cer ta i n
operat ion of such systems:
difficulties the establ ishment and
The problems raised
Requiring restoration as the remedy.
To meet an obligation of restoring environmental damage , what level of
environmental restoration is to be sought, what is to be done where
restoration to the state before is not feasible and what costs are
reasonable?
How can monitoring of the restoration works to ensure quality control
be incorporated into the system?
Who is to be responsible for ensuring the qual ity of the restoration
work?- 21 -
Allocating the cost of restor at Ion.
The "polluter pays" principle requires that , wherever possible, costs
of restoration are recovered from the parties responsible for causing
the damage. If the particular party cannot be identified or is not
Ilabi~ . It could be possible, in certain cases, to trace the cause of
the damage to the activities of a particular economic sector. In such
case, should a joint compensation system allocate the cost of
restorat ion among a II members of that sector?
The need to undertake restoration would have to be balanced against
the burden on the enterpr i ses shar i ng the costs, of course. I f the
financial burden of a joint compensation system became too great for
its contributors, costs of restoring particular damage might be shared
more broadly, with other sectors or by taxpayers in general. In order
to respect the "polluter pays principle to the greatest degree
poss i b Ie, shou I d not the burden rest upon the sector or sectors most
speclflCaJly responslbJe?
1.3 Maintaining a preventative effect.
If joint compensation systems are estabJ jshed , shouJd the concept of
individual liability stiJl be retained so as to have a preventative
effect? Linking the likelihood of damage to the amount of charges to be
paid would provide a mechanism by which the preventative effect could
be maintained and would maintain the incentive for effective risk
management. How could such a system of differentiated charges be
des i gned and by what means cou I d the adm I ni st rat Ion of such an approach
be ach i eved?
The experience gained on the national and international level can
provide useful guidance for designing compensation structures to cover
the costs of restoration within the Community.
Solutions adopted at national and International levels
A number of Member States and other countries have already established
forms of joint compensation to deal with specific problems of
environmental damage. These act as important precedents.
International Schemes
For instance, there are special compensat ion funds for damage caused by
industries posing a particular risk of damage. This type of fund
supplements the compensation which can be obtained from the polluters
themse I ves and the j r insurers. They are used to redress acc i denta I
pollution by helping to provide more complete and timely compensation
for injured part ies.
The oi I industry in part icular has set up a number of funds to finance
clean-up measures and to compensate injured parties. Most notable 
the International Fund for Compensation for 011 Pollution Damage,
established in 1971 via the International Convention on the
Establ ishment of an Internat ional Fund for Compensat ion for Oi I
Pollution Damage. This fund complements the 1969 Brussels Convention
which imposes strict liability on the shipowner but allows liability to- 22 -
be limited if there was no fault. Contributors are private members of
the 01 I industry, not governments. The fund makes payments where the
shipowner is not I table under the Convention, is insolvent , or when the
damages exceed the shipowner I iabi I ity I imlt. The fund compensates
for personal injur ies and property damage, and for measures actually
taken to reinstate the environment. Several parallel financial
structures, known as TOVALOP,
(18) CRISTAL, (19) and OPOL,(20) have
been formed privately by the Oi I industry. It should be noted that , in
view of the recent oi I-spi lis off Corunna and the Shet land Islands, a
Community action programme Is being prepared which aims to ensure
strict convergence in the implementation of international rUles
throughout the Community and to encourage the adoption of appropriate
regulations and standards by the IMO. The role of the Community and
Member States in drawing up international standards on safety and
pollution prevention is spelt out in a draft Commission Communication
on a common pOlicy for safety at sea.
National Schemes
Other funds have been created to finance actua 
I restorat ion of damage.
The United States ' Superfund is an example of this type of financial
instrument. Establ Ished in order to finance the clean-up of hazardous
waste sites , Super fund is funded by taxes on crude oil and chemical
feedstocks, as we II as  genera I envi ronmenta I tax on Amer i can
corporations. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) useS
Superfund monies to respond to short-term emergencies, such as
accidental spi lis of hazardous substances, and to clean up sites
contaminated in the past. Civil liability is used to recover costs
when potentially I iable parties can be identified for particular sites.
The compensation system set UP by SWeden under its 1986 Environmental
Damage Act should also be mentioned. It provides compensation for
persona I Injury and damage to property where the damage cannot be
traced to an identifiable source, the I iable party is insolvent , or the
liability is statute-barred. Every enterprise requiring 
environmental permit must contribute an amount fixed according to the
type of enterprise and its size. In addition , enterprises must maintain
insurance to cover any liability resulting directly from their own
activities. The system does not cover environmental damage unless 
can be considered damage to property " for which a natural person would
be entitled to compensation.
II(21)
The French Fund for noise should be mentioned, which compensates
persons living around Paris airports for being exposed to excessive
noise levels. The fund was created by decree in 1973; it is financed
( 20)
Tankers Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liabi I ity for OJ I
Pollut ion reimburses governments for expenses incUrred 
protecting and cleaning up coast I ines (1969; updated 1978).
Contract Regarding Interim Supplement to Tanker Liabi! ity for
Oi I Pollution provides compensation above TOVALOP's limits
(1971; updated 1978).
The Offshore Po Ilut Ion L i abll i ty Agreement guarantees
compensat ion for pollut ion damage caused by offshore 0 
i I
exploration or exploitation installations (1974).
Annex B to the Government Dec I s ion of 25 May 1989, No. 37.
( 18)
( 19)
(21)- 23 -
by charges paid by all companies using the airports in question.
Similarly, the Netherlands created, by a Law of 1972, a Fund on damage
from air pollut ion. The fund Intervenes where the polluter cannot be
identified. It may also pay compensation where Identification of the
polluter might delay payment to the victim, if victims cede "their
rights" against the polluter to the Fund.
Proposals at a COmmunity level
In the amended proposal for a Counci I Directive on civl  I iabi I ity for
damage caused by waste, Article 11 provides that. " the Commission shall
study the feas i b i I i ty of the estab I i shment of  European fund for
compensat ion for damage and impa i rment of the envi ronment caused by
waste to cover those cases where the person I jab I e cannot be
identified or is incapable of providing full compensation(22)
SimilarlY, the proposal for a Council Directive on the landfill of
waste provides in Article 18 that Member states shall ensure the
estab I i shment of one or more "Landf i II aftercare funds" whose purpose
is to cover the normal costs of aftercare of closed landfi lis and
expenses caused by necessary operat ions to prevent or cure damage from
waste d i sposa I not otherw i se recoverab Ie. The fund is to 
constituted by contributions from operators of landfi lis based upon the
type of landfill operated and the tonnage of waste deposited(23)
Possible directions for community action:
Civi I I iabi I ity as a compensation mechanism is based on the existence
of damage resulting in an economic loss.
In the case of damage to the environment , economic loss does not occur
unless there is a diminution in economic value or a restoration
resulting in costs.
The purpose of this Green Paper is to stimulate discussion on whether
and how requirements to remedy environmental damage might be introduced
appropriately and effectively within the Community to recover the costs
of such restorat ion.
1 A hor I zon1a 1 approach towards civil
anv Ironment
Ilabi I ity for damage to the
Civi I I iabi I ity could have an important role to play in a comprehensive
env i ronmenta I protect ion programme.
As the Member states develop the policies and programmes for
maintaining and restoring their environments to meet Community quality
standards, clvi I liability could be used for recovering the costs of
the requ1 red restoration.
(22) 192 23.07.91,
190, 22.07. (23)- 24 -
Civi I I iabi I ity can contr ibute towards implementing the "polluter pays
principle. Its usefulness is I imlted, however, to specific incidents
of damage involving identifiable I table parties.
As is shown in Figure 1 for  reparation of environmental damage to be
effective each component haS to meet certain conditions. Thus where
there is no Identifiable liable party, the principle of civil liability
is not effective in securing restoration of the damaged environment. 
is for these reasons that consideration has to be given to the type of
civi I I iabi I ity mechanism (fault based or strict) and other mechanisms
(compensation systems) to ensure that environmental restoration wi 
take place.
Figure I: Applicability of Civil Liability
In Instances of Environmental Damage
Measur ab I e and
immed I ate damage
~---------------~
Unbounded or latent
damage
F i ni te act or
inc I dent
~---------------~
Cumu I at i va acts or
inc i dents
I dent if I ab I e Ii ab I e 
~---------------~
part ies
Unidentifiable liable
part ies
L lab i I i ty (fau I t- 
~---------------~
based or str i ct)
No bas i s for I i ab i lit Y
Causa I link
estab I i shed
~-------
------~ No causa I Ii 
determ i nab I 
Party wi th lega 
interest who can
br ing act ion
~-----
----------~ No party wi th legal
interest to br i ng
act Ion
Civil liability
act Ion possible
CivIl I jabi II ty
not useful;
joint compensat ion
mechan I 8m needed- 25 -
Fault-based liability
Although this regime would appear to be an appropriate mechanism for
promoting compliance with environmental legislation, is it sufficient
to apply fault-based I iabi I ity alone to environmental damage?
Th i $ system does not appear to be the best approach in every caSe since
it contains certain disadvantages. The desired objectives cannot be
achieved fully unless certain conditions are met.
A system of fault-based I labi I ity impl ies that fault has to be proven.
Doing so in the case of damage to the environment is difficult, if not
impo$slble in certain cases. A sY$tem of fault-based liability
requires the injured party to prove and demonstrate that the person
responsible for the damage committed a wrongful act, i. e. that he wa$
gui Ity of negl igence or an otherwise unlawful act that caused damage.
A finding of fault depends on whether the party had a duty to behave
accord i ng to ~ certa i n st~ndard of care or ru I e of law, and breached
that duty.
The standards and the procedures $et down in environmental legislation
can provide guidance for determining whether a party s actions were
reasonab I e or neg I i gent under the circumstances. It is not a I ways
poss i b Ie, however , to dec i de on th is because of gaps in env ironment
law. Certain circumstances pertaining to damage could not be evaluated
on the bas i s of standards or procedures. Hence it wou I d be d if fi cu It
to judge whether the party responsible for damage had acted wrongfully
or not , even if mechan isms were added to a fau I t-based I i ab i I i ty system
to s impl i fy aspects such as the burden of proof.
In spite of the advantages of fault-based I iabi I ity in maximising the
important preventative effect of civil liabi I ity, the trend visible
throughout national legislation and international .instruments regarding
environmental damage is towards a strict liability regime for certain
acti v i ties dangerous to the env ironment.
Strict liability
At this point it is appropriate to look at the role of a strict , or no-
fault liability regime. Could the objective of repairing
envirqnmental damage be achieved fully and properly by implementing
some type of no-fault I iabi I ity regime?
Strict I iabi I ity appears to be particularly suited to the specific
features of repairing environmental damage.
Compared with fault-based liability, strict liability eases the burden
of at tach i ng Ii ab i Ii ty because fau I t need not be estab I i shed. However
the injured party must st i II prove that the damage was caused by
someone s act.
The advantages of such a system can be summarized as follows. A strict
I iabi I ity regime can increase incentives for better risk management and
provide legal certainty for those economic enterprises subject to such- 26 -
a regime. It can also help Implement the "polluter pays " principle for
certain types of economic activities. It means that this system
guarantees that the cost of damage caused by an economic activity 
borne by the operator.
A strict I labi I ity regime can only achieve Its objective if a number of
important quest ions are sett led before the decision is taken to opt for
that regime. For it to work effectively, the elements of the scheme
must be defined precisely. The choices to be made are important
because they wi II determine the scope of the I labi I ity regime, and the
issues to be sett led are set out below.
An extremely extensive strict I iabillty regime could pose too great a
burden to be borne by certa in sectors wh I ch cou I d I ead to greater
disruption of the eco~omy. (24)
A - What def i ni t ion of damage shou I d be adopted?
As has already been pointed out, the legal definition of environmental
damage assumes particular significance insofar as it affects decisions
regarding the type and extent of restoration measures needed and
therefore the costs which can be recovered via civi  I iabi I ity. This
problem involves other underlying Questions such as the definition of
env ironment, and the degree of impa I rment wh i ch const i tutes damage.
B - To which activities should a strict liability regime be applied?
Several approaches can be considered. As stated above with regard to
past exper i ences, too broad a system, i. e. cover i ng a I arge number of
activities, may have adverse consequences for economic operators and
create legal uncertainty, thereby becoming impossible to implement.
How does such a regime take account of a sector such as transport which
is characterised by, in particular, its mobi Ie nature and the variation
in risk according to the mode of transport?
The Question of the scope of strict liability is linked to the
underlying problem of what is meant by "dangerous What criteria
should be used to decide whether certain activities are dangerous and
therefore to be covered by a strict liability regime? No-fault
liability regimes relating to dangerous activities must be based on a
common understanding of what is deemed "dangerous
C - What shall constitute a I iable party?
This Question raises the issue of channel I ing no-fault I iabi I ity 
that costs are distributed fairly and effectively.
Should I iabi I ity be channelled to the party with the technical know-
how, resources and operational control of the activity?
Establ ishing a no-fault I iabi I ity regime also raises issues such as the
burden of proof, limitation of li.ability and what a financial guarantee
system shou I d cons I st of.
( 24) See Annex I I for deta i I s of USA exper I ence.- 27 -
Further problems need to be solved to ensure the proper implementation
of a strict liability regime, with its associated benefits for the
environment. Lessons must be learned from national and international
precedents in strict liability and the disadvantages and implications
for the scope and structure of such a regime must be foreseen (how
lenders and financial Institutions wi II be affected, for example). A
strict liability regime must only have the result intended, namely the
restorat ion of env i ronmenta I damage.
TO settle a.11 the points raised by the issue of establ ishing a civi 
I iabi I ity regime with particular regard to environmental damage, one of
the options facing the Community would be to adopt the approach laid
down by the Counci I of Europe Convention on civi  I iabi I ity for damage
resul t ing from act iv i ties dangerous to the envi ronment and then
consider signing the Convention.
If the Council of Europe Convention is adopted as a solution for a
strict I i.abi I ityregime to be appl ied throughout the Community, special
importance should be attached to the provisions of the Convention which
allow contracting parties complete flexibility for laying down
implementing conditions. This could be the case particularly with the
compulsory financial guarantee system provided for by the Convention.
Alternatively, the Council of Europe Convention could be the starting
point for Community initiative regarding environmental damage.
Elements of that Convention could provide the answers to the main
issues set out above, namely what constitutes environmental damage,
defining the I iable party, and determining which activities should be
covered by a no-fault I iabi I ity regime.
2 A hor Izontal approach towards jOint compensat Ion systems
Civil liability is a useful legal instrument for recovering the costs
of restor i ng env i ronmental damage as we I I as for its prevent i on and
enforcement funct ions.
Effective as it is, there are limits to its effectiveness. Civil
I iabi I ity can apply only when certain conditions are met. For example,
if the causal I ink between the damage and the I iable party cannot be
established , the I iabi I ity mechanism cannot operate. The question of
who is then respons i b I e for restor i ng the damaged env ironment and
bear I ng the costs I nvo I ved a I so rema I ns un so I ved.
If recovery of costs is impossible via a I iabi I ity act ion, other
mechan isms wou I d eventual I y be needed to ass i gn respons i b i I i ty for the
costs of restoring damaged environments. Consideration therefore has
to be given to how to cope with the t imits inherent in a civi I
I iabi I ity regime. A possible solution is to have joint compensation
mechanisms to cover the costs of environmental restoration. This would
enable responsibility for costs to be shared fairly within the economic
sector most closely connected to the presumed source of the damage.
One solution could therefore consist of combining the strengths of a
I iabi I ity regime with the advantages of compensation systems.- 28 -
On a practical level, this .integrated "environmental" I iabi I ity regime
could take the form of the following alternatives:
In the event of damage attributable to the action of a single
I iable party, compensation would be sought via civi  I iabi I ity.
If the damage could not be attributed to the activities of a liable
party (i.e. the liable party could not be identified), joint
compensation mechanisms, as decentral ized as possible, could be
used. The costs of restorat ion would be divided between a number
of economic sectors.
In the I Ight of this could one consider an approach where the
strengths of civi  I iabi I ity would come into play and its I imitations
would be made up for by the advantages of compensation mechanisms?
3 Looking Ahead
On the basis of the possible directions set out above the Commission
proposes to stimulate CommunitY-Wide discussion, among all parties with
an interest in the issues canvassed in this Communication , according to
the following timetable: Comments are to be received before 1 October
1993.- 1 -
ANNEX I
Trends at Member state level
The characteristic of this legislation Is that Ilabi I Ity may be
established without fault. By way of Illustration:
Belgian Law of 22 February 1974 on toxic waste, which holds the
generator of toxic waste strictly liable for damage caused by that
waste;
Belgian Royal Decree of 16 October 1981 on the control of organisms
harmful to plants and plant products, which holds the owner of the
I and on wh i ch such organ isms or i gi nate I jab I e for any damage caused
by the I r spread;
French Law of 15 July 1975 on waste, which states that any party
transferr ing certain waste elsewhere than to the operator of an
authorized disposal plant shall be strictlY I iable for any damage
caused by that waste;
Greek Framework Law no. 1650 of 1986 on env i ronmenta I protect ion
which provides that any natural person who or legal person which
causes pollution or deterioration to the environment shall be
strictly liable for that damage;
United Kingdom Environmental Protection Act 1990 which lays down
strict liability rules for damage resulting from the illegal
disposal of waste;
Por tuguese Bas i c Law on the Env ironment no. 11/1987 wh i ch prov ides
for strict I iabi I ity for significant damage to the environment
caused bya dangerous activity;
German Water Resources Act 1960 which holds the author of an
unauthorized pol lution of water strictly I iable for any damage
caused;
German Law on Environmental Liabi Iity 1990 which provides for a
comprehensive system of strict liability for the operation of
Industrial facilities which present a risk to the environment.- 2 -
ANNEX I I
S I tuat Ion In non-t.aember states: Japan and the Un I ted Stat~s
Under  JaDanese law I lab i I I ty for env i ronmenta I damage is based on the
Civi I Cod~and certain laws concerning pollution, which determine
civil , criminal and administrative liability. The large number Of
cases of damage caused to persons and property have resulted in
Japanese judges interpreting the laws In favour of the injured part ies.
The laws concerning air and water pollution have been amended with the
result that the polluter Is liable for any damage even In cases where
it is not his fault. This principle of strict liability applies In
Japan only as regards bod I Iy harm. In other cases, the fault of the
polluter has to be proven.
In order to improve the position of the Injured party, Japanese law has
developed two theories: the theory of tolerance I imits and the
probab i I i ty theory. Accord log to the first theory, there are certa 
nu i sances wh I ch must be to I era ted by peop Ie. 1f t hose nu i sances ex ceed
the I imit of what Is tolerable, the injured party may take legal
action. The I imits are determined according to the nature of the
damage. This may be bOdi Iy harm, damage to property or nervous shock.
According to the second theory, the Injured party only has to show the
posslbi I ity of the existence of the causal I ink between the wrongful
act and the damage i tse If.
In cases of pollution where the polluters are not identifiable, there
is a compensation fund which gives Immediate assistance to all parties
who have SUffered bodily Injury.
Under the Japanese law of 5 October 1973 on compensat ion for bodi 
injury resulting from pollution , any Injured party suffering damage to
health caused by water or air pollution receives compensation , after
examination by a bOard, without having to Identify the person
responsible or prove any fault. The fund is constituted from levies on
pollutant emissions and from a proportion of the tax on motor vehicles.
Compensat ion is automat ic, however , only in major risk areas and for
spec if i ca I I Y listed i I I nesses.
It should be noted that Japan is currently drafting a law on product
Ii ab III ty. Different draft I aws have been drawn up by var ious groups.
In general , all the proposals recognize no-fault I iabil ity and
establ ish a presumption on defects in products. The proposals cover
all sectors of industrial activity. Liabi I ity appl ies to both
manufacturers and impor ters.
In the  United states , civil 11abllity for damage to the environment 
based on both the Common Law and sir i ct c I v II Ii ab i I i ty from statute
law.
The Common Law uses concepts such as "nuisance
, "
trespass
negligence " and "ultra-hazardous activity " to enable victims to take
legal action against polluters.
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A federal law entitled CERCLA (comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation Liability Act) was enacted In 1980. It set up the
Superfund , a federal fund fInancing environmental clean-up measures,
thereby enabling the government to take prompt action to remove any
threat to human health and to minimize risks which heavi Iy polluted
sites might pose In the future.
This law has thus established a strict liability regime under which the
government can recover the cost of restor.at Ion of the env I ronment from
potentially responsible parties" orPRPs.
The law states that firms may be held responsible for discharges they
made In the past, even If the latter were not i Ilegal at the time. The
I labl Iity defined In CERCLA Is both strict - I. e. Irrespective of
whether fault or negligence has been committed or not - and joint and
severa I .
Under the Nat iona I Emergency program, a l i st must be drawn up and
revised annually In order to identify priority sites and installations
throughout the United states. In 1989, this national I ist ("Superfund
National Priorities List" or NPL) contained 981 sites to which the
provisions on immediate clean-up appl.led.
Clean-up measures are funded by the Super fund, wh i ch pays for remova I
and restorat ion operat ions. Congress increased the Superfund budget by
USD 8.5 bl II Ion for the 1986-91 per lod.
Federal action on I isted sites is I imited to those cases where the
respons I bl e part i es cannot be I dent I f i ed or fa i I to take the necessary
action. It is thus secOndary to action to be taken by potentially
responsible private parties. The Environmental Protection Agency is
the authority responsible for' implementation of this law. First, it
classifies sites in need of restoration. Second, it identifies, from
the potentiallY responsible parties (PRPs), those who are deemed to be
I iable and therefore required to repair the damage caused. The
Environment Protection Agency takes "aggressive" legal action against
PRPs to recover clean-up costs. It bases its arguments particularly on
several Ilabi I ity and on the definition of PRPs.
According to the terms of the law, a large number of persons may be
considered "potentially responsible parties They include the current
owner of the site, the owner at the time it was polluted , the
industr lal operator generat ing the waste, the transporter of the waste
and the waste dea1er. Inpract1ceJ even credit inst1tut1ons such as
banks may be deemed I jab I e lf they have taken possess i on of
contaminated land under mortgage.
Parties held I lable for discharges of hazardous substances are required
law to effect clean-up operations, carry out full restoration and
thus bear the (very high) costs of repairing the damage. The average
cost of restoration of a polluted site is put atUS$ 29-35 million.- 4 -
The courts have devised wide-ranging regulations covering Ilabl Iity.
The liability regime arising from CERCLA heavily favours government
act Ions for recovery of damages, thus leaving PRPs exposed to the
threat of heavy expend I ture.
However , hazardous waste has turned out to be a bigger problem than was
originally expected , and clean-up costs have proved to be very high.
This policy and the Inadequate level of financial resources at the
Superfund' s disposal has resulted in a large number of court actions
involving persons identified as I iable, their insurers, their bankers
and the Env i ronmenta I Protect Ion Agency. The number of persons
currently involved In I Itlgation by virtue of CERCLA is put at 14 000.
In one single case the number of Insurers Involved as a result of the
Env i ronmenta I Protect Ion Agency act ion was we II over 400. The number
of court cases and proceedings initiated, accounts for about 30-60% of
the financial expenditure of the Environmental Protection Agency,
operators and Insurers concerned . Consequent I Y proceedings have become
extremely long and complicated.
Equally, the way the system works has led Insurers operating in the
American market to change their thinking with regard to cover for
environmental risks. Apart from an increase in premiums, current
pol icies In this market exclude a large number of risks. In a number
of cases cover against pollution is not available, as inSurers have
deemed certain activities non-insurable.
AS far as cred i t I nst i tut ions are concerned, there has been a
tightening up of the criteria for the granting of loans to owners 
operators of waste dumps.
The CERCLA system has COme in for sharp cr it i c i  sm since one of its
objectives, namely full and prompt restoration of polluted sites, has
proved Impossible to achieve in practice. The CERCLA system Is said to
be hav i ng a "perverse effect.. Proposa I s for major amendments to the
system and the way it operates have been made by the var ious part ies
concerned (the authorities, industry, Insurers, academics , etc.
The proponents of CERCLA argue that the merit of this legislation lies
in the fact that it has changed the behaviour of firrns and their
approach to environmental Issues. They maintain that because of the
law it has peen necessary to under take stud i es or env ironment a I aud Its
before embarking on any commercial transaction.
Desp i te amendments to CERCLA made by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act 1986 (SARA), which have toned down the extremely
harsh character of this system of I iabll Ity by providing for the
concept of the " innocent landowner" who is ent i tied to preferent i a I
treatment if he can prove that he did not and could not have known that
his land was contaminated, the criticisms and problems continue.- 5 -
ANNEX I I I
Trends at Internat lonal level
Table I : International COnventions on
Civil liability and COmpensation
(part tal list)
Hue lear energy
1960 Paris COnvention on Third Party Llabl Iity In the Field of Nuclear
Energy, as amended by the 1964 Additional Protocol
(In force) (8, DE , DK, ES, F ., GR , IT, NL , P, UK)
1963 Brusse Is Convent ion estab I ish ing a supplementary compensat ion
system for damage caused by nuc I ear i nc i dents
(in force) (B, DE . DK, ES, F, IT , NL , UK)
1963 Vienna Convention on Clvi I Liability for Nuclear Damage
(In force)
1988 Vienna Joint Protocol Relating to the Appl Icatlon of the Vienna
convent Ion and the Par Is Convent ion
(not yet in force)
OJ I pOllution
1969 Brussels Convention on Civi I Liabi I ity for 01 I Pollution Damage,
as amended
(in force) (8, DE , ES, F, GR , IR, IT, NL , P , UK)
1971 Brussels Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensat Ion for 011 Pollut ion Damage, as amended
(in force) (DE , DK, ES, F , GR , IT , NL , P, UK)
1977 London Convention on Clvl I Liabi I ity for Oi I Pollution Damage
Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral
Resources
(not yet 1n force)
Carriage of dangerous materials and other dangerous activities
1971 Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of
Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material
(in force) (DE , DK, ES, F , IT)
1989 Geneva Convent Ion onC I v II Li ab II i ty for Damage Caused Our I 
Carr lage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Ra II and I n I and Nav igat ion Vesse I s
(not yet In force)
Convention on Liabi I ity and Compensation in Connection with the
Carr i age of Hazardous and Nox ious Substances by Sea- 6 -
(be Ing drafted)
Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability  for  Damage Resulting
from Act I vi ties Dangerous to the Envl ronment
(not yet in force)
Table II International COnventions containing
a Provision on Civil liability
(partial list)
Mar Ine Protect Ion
1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and other Matter, as amended (Art. 10)
(in force) (B , DE , OK , ES, F , GR, IR , IT, NL, P, UK)
1976 Barcelona Convention  for  the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution (Art. 12)
(in force) (ES, F , GR , IT, EEC)
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Art. 279)
(not yet In force)
1983 Cartagena Convent ion  for  the Protect ion and Deve lopment of the
Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region (Art. 14)
(.in  force)  , NL , UK)
1985 Nairobi Convention " or the Protection, Management and Development
of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region
(Art. 15)
(not yet in force)
Fifth Barcelona Protocol  for  the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution Resulting  from  Exploration and Exploitation of the
Continental Shelf and the Sea-Bed and its Sub-Soi I (Art. 27)
(be i ng drafted)
Antarct Ic Protect Ion
1988 Well ington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities (Art. 8)
(not yet in force)
Transboundary Pollut Ion
1989 Base I Convent ion on the Contro I of TranSboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and The i r D i sposa I (Ar t. 12)
(ECE-UN) Convent ion on the Protect ion and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and I nternat iona I Lakes (Art. 7)
(ECE-UN) Convention on the Transboundary Impacts of Industrial
Accidents (Art. 18)- 7 ~
ANNEX I V
The System created by the Council of Europe Convent Ion
In the last five years the Counci I of Europe has been drafting a
Convention on civil liability for damage resulting from activities
dangerous to the env Ironment . conta in I ng a more genera I approach than
the abovel1lent loned i nternat I ona I Convent Ions.
On 26 March 1992 the council granted the Commission a negotiating
mandate(1) for the areas within Community competence with regard to
the Convent ion.
Apart from the European Community and the Member States, the EFTA
countr ies and a growing number of Central and Eastern European
countries have participated in the negotiations. The Convention
provides for the possibi lity of non-members of the Counci I of Europe
becom I ng party to the Convent Ion.
The aim and objective of the Convention is to provide adequate
compensation for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the
environment. The Convention also puts forward measures for damage
prevent Ion and restor at Ion of the env Ironment.
The concept of damage covers damage resul t i ng from impa i rment of the
env ironment , damage caused to persons and proper ty and the cost of
protect i ve measures, I.e. measures taken to prevent or a Ilev i ate
damage. Damage may be the result of a single action or a chronic
process of pollution. It should be noted that the definition of
environment" in the Counci I of Europe Convention is widely drafted
(see point 2. 3 of the main report)
norder to achi eve the ob ject i ve of repa i ring env i ronmental damage
adequately, the Convention introduces a strict liability regime.
According to the Convention , the person liable is the operator, i.
the person supervising the dangerous activity at the time the incident
occurs or , in the specific case of permanent waste storage sites, at
the time the damage becomes known.
I n the Convent ion , the term "dangerous act i v i ty " refers to a
professional activity involving dangerous substances, genetically
modified organisms or mlcro-organisms. The concept also covers the
operat ion of waste insta Ilat ions or sites, inc Iud i ng permanent waste
storage sites. (See further section 2. 2 of this Annex as regards the
definition of the scope of liability in the Convention , section 2.
concerning the burden of proof and section 2. 7 concerning insurance and
f i nanc i a I secur i ty under the Convent ion).
(1) Commission mandate concerning the negotiations for an International
convention on damage resulting from activities dangerous to the
env Ironment (Counc I I of Europe)
SEC(91) 750 f i na I .
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The Convention does give environmental associations and foundations the
right to take court action to secure the implementation of preventive
or restorat I ve measures.
The Convention states that the above-mentioned organi~ations may bring
an action In court requesting " the prohibition of a dangerous activity
which Is unlawful and poses a grave threat of damage to the
env Ironment"
; .
or an order to the operator "to take measures to prevent
an Incident or damage ; or an order to the operator " to take measures
to prevent damage after an incident has taken place ; or an order to
the operator " to take measures of re Instatement"
The Convention makes provision for accession by the European Economic
Community. The Community has voting rights, within the Standing
Comm.lttee responsible for monitoring problems of interpretation and
implementation raised by the Convention, which it may exercise in its
areas of competence.
The Convent ion was adopted on 8 March 1993 and w I II be open for
signature from 21 June 1993. I t wi II enter into force after the th i rd
ratification.
The Commi ttee of Experts of the Counc i I of Europe, wh i ch has drawn up
the Convention, has decided that the next step wi II be to look at other
forms of reparation fOr environmental damage, in particular
compensa t Ion funds.